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The Hon. Jason Poydras  
Feb. 14, 2025, at 10 a.m.  
With Oral Argument

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON  
FOR KING COUNTY

GRE DOWNTOWNER LLC, a Washington  
limited liability company, d/b/a ADDISON  
ON FOURTH,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SEATTLE,

Defendant.

No. 24-2-24318-6 SEA

**GRE DOWNTOWNER’S OPPOSITION  
TO THE CITY OF SEATTLE’S  
MOTION TO DISMISS**

**I. INTRODUCTION AND RELIEF REQUESTED**

This action concerns the economic devastation wrought upon GRE Downtowner LLC’s low-income housing property (the “Addison”) by six of the City of Seattle’s (the “City”) ordinances (the “Ordinances”). These Ordinances did not simply regulate the landlord-tenant relationship. Rather, they collectively went “too far,” destroyed the value of the Addison, and rendered it unsaleable. Further, the Ordinances that grant occupancy rights to “immediate family members” (which include even *former* dating partners) of the Addison’s existing tenants have affected a physical invasion of the Addison. GRE Downtowner has pleaded more than enough facts to support its inverse condemnation claims. That is, the Complaint sufficiently alleges (1) a partial regulatory taking claim under *Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York*, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978), and (2) a per se physical taking claim.

1           Given the detailed allegations of the Verified Complaint (the “Complaint”), which must  
2 be accepted as true, the City’s Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) should be denied.

3           First, GRE Downtowner’s regulatory taking claim is timely. Washington Supreme Court  
4 precedent directly contradicts the City’s argument otherwise. It has been the law for decades that  
5 the “mere passage of time alone does not bar” a plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim.  
6 *Petersen v. Port of Seattle*, 94 Wn.2d 479, 483, 618 P.2d 67 (1980). The three-year statute of  
7 limitations does not apply here. But even if it did, the *Penn Central* claim did not accrue until  
8 2022 at the earliest.

9           Second, GRE Downtowner pled facts to sufficiently allege its *Penn Central* claim. Even  
10 a brief review of the 38-page Complaint makes this obvious. The Complaint contains a wealth  
11 of allegations demonstrating the economic devastation on GRE Downtowner attributable to the  
12 Ordinances. Regulatory takings claims are “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” that require  
13 courts and juries to undertake “careful examination and weighing of all the relevant  
14 circumstances.” *Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency*, 535 U.S.  
15 302, 322, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1478, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002) (citation omitted). Accordingly,  
16 courts are loathe to grant motions to dismiss in this context, even where plaintiffs provide far *less*  
17 factual material than GRE Downtowner has here. One cannot both accept GRE Downtowner’s  
18 factual allegations (as is required) and grant the City’s Motion.

19           Third, GRE Downtowner has pleaded that the Roommate Ordinance—whose effect is  
20 exacerbated by other Ordinances—resulted in a physical taking of the Addison. A regulation  
21 constitutes a physical taking when it requires a landowner to submit to the physical invasion of  
22 their property by a third party that the landlord did not invite onto the land. *See Cedar Point*  
23 *Nursery v. Hassid*, 594 U.S. 139, 149, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072, 210 L. Ed. 2d 369 (2021). This is  
24 precisely the effect the Roommate Ordinance has had on the Addison. It forces GRE  
25 Downtowner to allow third parties it did not rent to or invite—even including tenants’ former  
26 dating partners—to occupy the Addison. That is a physical taking.

1 At this stage in the proceedings, given the multitude of factual allegations GRE  
2 Downtowner has pleaded, and given the CR 12(b)(6) standard—under which the allegations in  
3 the Complaint are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in GRE Downtowner’s  
4 favor—the City’s Motion should be denied. A Proposed Order is submitted herewith.

## 5 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

### 6 A. The Addison

7 The Addison began as the New Richmond Hotel in 1911, and was first converted into  
8 low-income housing in 1970. (Compl. ¶ 29.) In 2012, GRE Downtowner purchased the  
9 property for \$12.5 million and invested an additional \$26.5 million to make it a comfortable  
10 living space for people with limited means. (*Id.* ¶ 93.) GRE Downtowner is an affiliate of  
11 Goodman Real Estate, Inc. (“Goodman Real Estate”), which is located in and has served Seattle  
12 for over 30 years. (*Id.* ¶¶ 28–29). Goodman Real Estate was founded by John Goodman, a  
13 Seattle native and active philanthropist. Goodman Real Estate is and has been deeply committed  
14 to Seattle—as well as low-income housing and other forms of housing in Washington—for  
15 decades. (*Id.* ¶ 2.) Additionally, for many years, Goodman Real Estate has invested in  
16 commercial real estate to serve local businesses. (*Id.*)

17 The Addison was placed in service in the federal Low Income Housing Tax Credit  
18 (“LIHTC”)<sup>1</sup> program in 2013, and in two short years, was fully renovated and operational. (*Id.*  
19 ¶ 30.) From the beginning, a direct affiliate or former affiliate of Goodman Real Estate has  
20 served as the Addison’s property manager. (*Id.* ¶¶ 28–29.) The Addison provides Seattle with  
21 254 apartments at a rent limit of 60% of the area median income, 46 artist studios, and four  
22 commercial spaces. (*Id.* ¶ 30.)

23  
24 <sup>1</sup> The LIHTC program exists because Congress recognized that low-income housing is difficult to operate  
25 profitably, meaning that rational developers are hesitant to develop low-income housing. (Compl. ¶ 58.) Due to  
26 both (1) the low profit margins of low-income housing and (2) the acute shortage of affordable housing, LIHTC is  
crucial in providing developers the incentives to develop low-income housing. (*Id.* ¶¶ 52, 58). According to the  
federal government, the LIHTC program “is the most important resource for creating affordable housing in the  
United States today.” HUD Office of Policy Development & Research, *Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)*,  
*available at* <https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html> (last visited Feb. 2, 2025).

1 Prior to purchasing the Addison, GRE Downtowner projected it would be able to  
2 maintain and operate the complex at a small profit margin. (*Id.* ¶ 4.) GRE Downtowner’s  
3 expectations were informed by then-existing landlord-tenant laws and Goodman Real Estate’s  
4 own projections. (*Id.* ¶¶ 4, 31.) These investment-backed expectations are alleged to be  
5 reasonable. (*See, e.g., id.* ¶ 31.) No fewer than five distinct, reputable, and experienced groups  
6 reviewed and were comfortable with these financial projections at the time of financing.<sup>2</sup> (*Id.*  
7 ¶ 32.) They were, in fact, spot on. (*See id.* ¶ 88.) For four years (2015–2018), GRE  
8 Downtowner’s projections proved accurate as the adjusted net cash flow of the Addison  
9 performed as expected. (*Id.* ¶¶ 34, 86, 103.)

## 10 **B. The Ordinances**

11 Starting in 2017, the Seattle City Council began the process of passing six Ordinances.  
12 (*Id.* ¶ 35.) The cumulative impact of these Ordinances has transformed the Addison from a  
13 sustainable and profitable low-income property into a money pit that hemorrhaged \$2.7 million  
14 in 2023 alone. (*Id.* ¶ 20.) These six Ordinances are as follows—

15 The Fair Chance Housing Ordinance (SMC 14.09.025). This ordinance, first enforced in  
16 February 2018, prevents landlords from denying a prospective tenant residency based on their  
17 criminal record. (*Id.* ¶ 48.) The Complaint alleges that the cumulative effect of this and the  
18 other Ordinances has been to destroy, not merely damage, the economic viability of the Addison.  
19 (*Id.* ¶¶ 36–38, 48.)

20 The Roommate Ordinance (SMC 7.24.030). This ordinance, passed in late 2019, bestows  
21 tenancy rights to a rented unit on a broad variety of people who are not existing tenants, for  
22 instance, tenants’ former dating partners and family members—however tangential. (*Id.* ¶¶ 39,  
23 48.) More specifically, the Roommate Ordinance requires GRE Downtowner to allow tenants’

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24 <sup>2</sup> These included the Washington State Housing Finance Commission, Freddie Mac, Citigroup, East West  
25 Bank, and GRE Downtowner’s investor member, Stratford Downtowner Investors Limited Partnership. (*Id.* ¶¶ 31–  
26 32.) These parties all approved the investment forecast that supports the investment decisions of all the capital stack  
stakeholders. The investment-backed expectations relied, in part, on the stability of the relevant landlord-tenant  
laws in Washington State and Seattle. (*Id.* ¶ 33.)

1 “immediate family members” to reside at the Addison, but defines that phrase broadly as:  
2 “spouses, domestic partners, former spouses, former domestic partners, adult persons related by  
3 marriage, siblings, persons 16 years of age or older who are presently residing together or who  
4 have resided together in the past and who have or have had a dating relationship, and persons  
5 who have a parent-child relationship, including parents, stepparents, grandparents, adoptive  
6 parents, guardians, foster parents, or custodians of minors.” (Mot., App’x at 034.) The City’s  
7 characterization of the Roommate Ordinance as allowing “a tenant [to] invite a family member  
8 or a roommate . . . to live in an already-occupied unit” is euphemistic, as this “invitation” grants  
9 these individuals not the ability to just “live in” the unit, but occupancy rights. (*Id.* at 16.)

10 The Roommate Ordinance also prevents landlords from denying occupancy to any non-  
11 tenant within the broadly defined group. (Compl. ¶ 48.) This means that, for example, any  
12 tenant’s ex-dating partner, no matter how destructive to others at the Addison, cannot be refused  
13 occupancy or removed for trespass. Instead, GRE Downtowner is forced to *evict* these new  
14 “tenants” using the typical (lengthy and costly) eviction process. Then-Mayor of Seattle Jenny  
15 Durkan refused to sign this bill, for good reason, a matter that is the subject of focused discovery.  
16 (*Id.*)

17 The Winter Eviction Ban (SMC 22.205.080). On February 10, 2020, the City passed the  
18 Winter Eviction Ban, which precludes nearly all evictions from every December 1 through  
19 March 1—even those based on failure to pay rent. (*Id.* ¶ 42.) Mayor Durkan also refused to sign  
20 this bill, yet another focus of discovery. (*Id.* ¶ 48.)

21 The COVID-19 Eviction Moratorium (Executive Order 2020-03 et seq.). Throughout the  
22 height of the COVID-19 pandemic (March 2020 through February 28, 2022), the City also  
23 maintained another eviction moratorium that provided a nearly complete defense to eviction.  
24 (*Id.* ¶¶ 43, 48.) This moratorium applied to ***all instances of non-payment of rent*** without  
25 requiring a showing of inability to pay, predictably forcing landlords to house non-paying tenants  
26 for years. (*Id.* ¶ 43.)

1           180-Day Notice Requirement (SMC 7.24.030). This ordinance requires that landlords  
2 provide their tenants with 180 days of notice before imposing any rent increase. (*Id.* ¶ 45.)  
3 Mayor Durkan refused to sign this bill as well. (*Id.* ¶ 48.) This, too, is a focus of discovery.

4           Economic Displacement Relocation Assistance (“EDRA”) (SMC ch. 22.212). Finally,  
5 the EDRA program requires landlords to pay their former tenants if those tenants move due to a  
6 rent increase of 10% or more. (*Id.* ¶ 45.) If any such tenant moves due to a rent increase of more  
7 than 10%, EDRA requires GRE Downtowner to pay that tenant’s *entire new rent for three*  
8 *months*, regardless of whether the tenant suffered any increased costs. Mayor Durkan (who also  
9 refused to sign this bill) was so concerned about its implications that she noted that it “requires  
10 landlords . . . to pay essentially three months’ rent to the tenant as relocation fees . . . regardless  
11 of whether the property owner faces increased costs, including property taxes.” (*Id.*)

### 12           **C. The Cumulative Impact of the Ordinances**

13           The cumulative impact of all six Ordinances has been economically catastrophic. The  
14 Roommate Ordinance and the Fair Chance Housing Ordinance combine to force GRE  
15 Downtowner, for instance, to let apartments to third parties, some of whom are dangerous  
16 people, who in turn can then unilaterally bestow the legal right of occupancy on their former  
17 dating partners, who may then create additional dangers for other tenants or damage to property.

18           The loss of control over who occupies the property, predictably, has led to various forms  
19 of criminal behavior, which causes harm to other tenants and, of course, to the occupancy and  
20 value of the Addison. (*Id.* ¶¶ 18, 115.) The Seattle Police Department now requires a *minimum*  
21 *of three officers* to respond to any call at the Addison. (*Id.* ¶ 18.) Violent and destructive  
22 tenants have necessitated massive increases to security, insurance premiums and other costs,  
23 necessitating hundreds of thousands, and sometimes *millions* of dollars per year, in extra  
24 expenses. (*Id.* ¶¶ 78–84, 99.) And due to this violence and disruption, law-abiding residents of  
25 the Addison have been moving out for years, causing *vacancy rates to skyrocket to 44.85% in*  
26 *2023*. (*Id.* ¶ 63.)

1           With this many empty units at the Addison, GRE Downtowner must reliably collect rents  
2 from the tenants who remain—and evict those who refuse to pay. (*Id.* ¶¶ 65–69, 75.) But the  
3 City has made this virtually impossible, too. Between March 2020 and February 28, 2022, the  
4 COVID-19 Moratorium took away the last resort of eviction from GRE Downtowner, forcing  
5 GRE Downtowner to house tenants who could pay their agreed upon rent but refused to do so.  
6 (*Id.* ¶ 43.) This dynamic survives three months of every year now, through the Winter Eviction  
7 Ban. (*Id.* ¶ 42.) And because GRE Downtowner cannot deny tenancy based on criminal history,  
8 GRE Downtowner was and is forced to let apartments at the Addison to those most likely to  
9 abuse the eviction moratoria. (*Id.* ¶ 14.) GRE Downtowner cannot reliably collect rents from  
10 those who remain in an already half-empty Addison, and these Ordinances make it extremely  
11 difficult to evict serial non-payers in favor of tenants who will pay rent. (*Id.* ¶¶ 12–15.) After  
12 collecting roughly 93% of “gross potential rents” each year from 2015 through 2018, that  
13 amount has steadily ***decreased each year to a nadir of 44.1% in 2023.*** (*Id.* ¶¶ 66–68.)

14           The only other option to keep the Addison afloat is to raise rents. (*Id.* ¶ 44.) The City  
15 has also made this impossible. (*Id.* ¶ 71.) The effect of the 180-Day Notice Requirement and  
16 EDRA is to (1) prevent GRE Downtowner from raising rents until six months in the future (no  
17 matter what cost increases it suffers in the meantime), and (2) force GRE Downtowner to only  
18 raise rents by less than 10%. (*Id.* ¶¶ 46, 71.) If GRE Downtowner were to raise rents by more  
19 than 10%, it would run the risk of being forced to ***pay for three months of rent*** for any tenant  
20 who moved due to the increase. (*Id.* ¶ 17.)

21           The Addison has gone from success to financial catastrophe. It now hemorrhages  
22 millions of dollars each year, peaking at \$2.7 million in just 2023, with total operational losses of  
23 nearly \$6 million through 2023. (*Id.* ¶¶ 86–87.) Worse yet, this property in which GRE  
24 Downtowner invested \$39 million dollars is now functionally valueless. (*Id.* ¶¶ 22, 93.)

25           The City does not address the detailed allegations in the Complaint, instead  
26 characterizing them as “vague and conclusory.” (Mot. at 20.) There is nothing vague or

1 conclusory about them. While the City may disagree, the allegations are detailed on each  
2 element of GRE Downtowner’s *Penn Central* claim and physical taking claim. The cumulative  
3 effect of the City’s Ordinances, including those the Mayor refused to sign, is devastating.

### 4 III. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON

5 This opposition relies on the allegations contained in the Complaint filed in this action,  
6 and on all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in favor of GRE Downtowner.

### 7 IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY

#### 8 A. Legal Standards

9 Under CR 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate “only if it appears beyond doubt that the  
10 plaintiff can prove no set of facts, consistent with the complaint, which would entitle the plaintiff  
11 to relief.” *Bravo v. Dolsen Cos.*, 125 Wn.2d 745, 750, 888 P.2d 147 (1995) (internal quotation  
12 marks and citation omitted). Such motions should be granted “sparingly and with care,” and  
13 “only in the unusual case in which plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the  
14 complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief.” *Kinney v. Cook*, 159 Wn.2d 837, 842,  
15 154 P.3d 206 (2007) (citation omitted). When considering a motion to dismiss, all facts alleged  
16 in the complaint are presumed to be true, all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in the  
17 plaintiff’s favor, and the court “may even consider hypothetical facts.” *Trujillo v. Nw. Tr. Servs.*,  
18 *Inc.*, 183 Wn.2d 820, 830, 355 P.3d 1100 (2015).

19 The City’s Motion repeatedly, and incorrectly, treats GRE Downtowner’s claims as facial  
20 challenges, even suggesting that the statute of limitations should begin to run upon the passage of  
21 the Ordinances. The City largely ignores or refuses to deal with the actual allegations of the  
22 Complaint. “The plaintiff is ‘the master of the complaint,’ and therefore controls much about her  
23 suit.” *Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger*, No. 23-677, 604 U.S. \_\_, \_\_ S. Ct. \_\_, 2025  
24 WL 96212, at \*7 (Jan. 15, 2025) (quoting *Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams*, 482 U.S. 386, 398–399,  
25 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987)). The takings claims here are based on the *cumulative*

1 **impact** of the challenged Ordinances, as applied to the Addison. The City has gone too far, and  
2 the impact of the Ordinances, combined, has been severely damaging to GRE Downtowner.<sup>3</sup>

3 The Washington State Constitution prohibits the taking of private property for public use  
4 without just compensation. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16. Washington courts apply federal takings  
5 law to the merits of takings claims brought pursuant to the Washington State Constitution. *See*  
6 *Gonzales v. Inslee*, 21 Wn. App. 2d 110, 134, 504 P.3d 890 (2022), *aff'd*, 535 P.3d 864 (Wash.  
7 2023).

8 GRE Downtowner alleges both a partial regulatory taking and a physical taking of the  
9 Addison. Courts analyze partial regulatory takings under the framework established by the  
10 Supreme Court in *Penn Central*. Courts determine whether regulatory action amounts to a  
11 taking by analyzing three factors: (1) “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,”  
12 (2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed  
13 expectations,” and (3) “the character of the governmental action.” *Penn Central*, 438 U.S. at  
14 124. Such “factual inquiries” are “essentially ad hoc” and “designed to allow careful  
15 examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.” *Tahoe-Sierra*, 535 U.S. at 322  
16 (citation omitted).

17 There is no set formula for determining when a taking has occurred under *Penn Central*—  
18 rather, “[t]he outcome [of the *Penn Central* inquiry] . . . depends largely upon the particular  
19 circumstances [in the] case at hand.” *Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Land Use Comm’n*, 950 F.3d  
20 610, 630 (9th Cir. 2020) (last set of brackets in original; citation omitted).

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21  
22 <sup>3</sup> A government action that “impose[s] a severe enough burden on private property” can constitute a regulatory  
23 taking. *United States v. King Mountain Tobacco Co.*, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1092 (E.D. Wash. 2015), *aff'd*, 745 F.  
24 App’x 700 (9th Cir. 2018); *see also FFV Coyote LLC v. City of San Jose*, 637 F. Supp. 3d 761, 770 (N.D. Cal. 2022)  
25 (holding that the plaintiffs “plausibly alleged that the economic impact of the regulatory change may be so severe as  
26 to constitute a taking,” and explaining that “the extent of the economic impact on plaintiffs caused by the City’s  
actions remains a question of fact that cannot be resolved at the pleadings”). Put another way, a regulation that is  
otherwise a valid exercise of police power may go ““too far”” in its impact on a property owner as to constitute a  
taking, requiring compensation.” *Wash. Food Indus. Ass’n & Maplebear, Inc. v. City of Seattle*, 1 Wn.3d 1, 30, 524  
P.3d 181 (Wash. 2023) (quoting *Chong Yim v. City of Seattle*, 194 Wn.2d 651, 658–59, 451 P.3d 675 (2019)); *see*  
*Tahoe-Sierra*, 535 U.S. at 322–23 (explaining that the analysis of whether a regulation imposes a “severe” enough  
restriction is “complex”).

1 A physical taking is effected when the government “has physically taken property for  
2 itself or someone else[,] by whatever means.” *Cedar Point*, 594 U.S. at 149. Regulations that  
3 allow third parties on to an owner’s property “appropriate[] . . . the owners’ right to exclude” and  
4 thus constitute per se physical takings. *Id.*

5 **B. GRE Downtowner Brings Only As Applied Takings Claims for Just Compensation**

6 GRE Downtowner brings only “as applied” takings claims—those based on and limited  
7 to the Ordinances’ effects on GRE Downtowner—there is no claim that the mere enactment of  
8 the Ordinances effected a taking. Specifically, GRE Downtowner alleges that the *cumulative*  
9 *impact* of the Ordinances has resulted in (1) a regulatory taking of the Addison and (2) a per se  
10 physical taking of the Addison, in violation of Article I, section 16 of the Washington State  
11 Constitution. The nature and extent of this cumulative impact is, by definition, a question of fact  
12 as alleged in the Complaint.

13 **C. GRE Downtowner’s Regulatory Taking Claim Is Not Time-Barred**

14 The City argues that GRE Downtowner’s “regulatory takings challenge . . . is untimely”  
15 because federal courts apply underlying state personal injury statutes of limitation to claims  
16 brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) to vindicate federal rights, and thus  
17 Washington’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries “should” apply here. (Mot. at  
18 11.) The City is wrong.

19 **1. The Three-Year Personal Injury Statute Does Not Apply.**

20 The Supreme Court of Washington has held that inverse condemnation claims brought  
21 under state law are of “constitutional magnitude,” and, therefore, the “mere passage of time  
22 alone does not bar” a plaintiff’s “cause of action.” *Petersen*, 94 Wn.2d at 483. The City’s  
23 request that the court instead impose a *three*-year statute of limitations on GRE Downtowner’s  
24 constitutional claim is entirely inconsistent with Washington law.

25 In an attempt to support their argument that a three-year statute of limitations should  
26 apply, the City claims that “[b]orrowing the ten-year limitations period applicable to inverse

1 condemnation claims would be inappropriate.” (Mot. at 12.) The City is referring to the  
2 limitation on a plaintiff’s ability to seek damages for inverse condemnation, which usually  
3 requires the government to show “uninterrupted hostile use for 10 years which has been open  
4 and notorious.” *Petersen*, 94 Wn.2d at 485; *see also Robinson v. City of Seattle*, 119 Wn.2d 34,  
5 84, 830 P.2d 318 (1992), *abrogated on other grounds by Chong Yim*, 194 Wn.2d 651, and by  
6 *Yim v. City of Seattle*, 194 Wn.2d 682, 451 P.3d 694 (2019). But the City’s argument that the  
7 statute of limitations cannot be 10 years, so, therefore, it should be three years, ignores the  
8 Washington Supreme Court’s holding that the “mere passage of time alone does not bar” claims  
9 of “constitutional magnitude.” *Petersen*, 94 Wn.2d at 483. Under Washington law, the City  
10 cannot impose a three-year statute of limitations.

11 The City also contends that Washington’s three-year personal injury statute of limitations  
12 should apply to GRE Downtowner’s claims to align with the limitations periods of Section 1983  
13 claims. (*See* Mot. at 11–12.) But this is not a Section 1983 claim. No such claim is brought.  
14 The City’s suggestion again ignores Washington law and the Washington Supreme Court’s  
15 reasoning in *Petersen*. And the City does not explain what would be intolerable about  
16 “identical” claims brought under state and federal constitutions having different statutes of  
17 limitation. Various, substantively identical, state and federal causes of action have different  
18 statutes of limitation, and there is no obligation for states to cede to federal statutes of limitation.  
19 *See, e.g., Nissalke v. Benson*, No. 16-cv-00102, 2016 WL 4467889, at \*1 (D. Minn. Aug. 22,  
20 2016) (“But a different statute of limitations for state and federal remedies does not implicate  
21 any constitutional right—if this were true, then states would be obligated to adopt federal statutes  
22 of limitations for similar claims. This contention is without merit.”). Accordingly, the Court  
23 should reject the City’s suggestion to import Section 1983 statutory jurisprudence to this state  
24 constitutional claim.

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
1           **2. GRE Downtowner’s Taking Claim Is Still Timely**

2           That all said, GRE Downtowner’s claim is timely even under the three-year statute of  
3 limitations suggested by the City. The City erroneously asserts that GRE Downtowner’s claim  
4 accrued “upon the law’s passage,” because that is “when there is no question about how the  
5 challenged law applies to the property.” (Mot. at 13.) But the City’s own precedent does not  
6 actually address when GRE Downtowner’s *Penn Central* claim accrued. *See Suitum v. Tahoe*  
7 *Reg’l Plan. Agency*, 520 U.S. 725, 731, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1663, 137 L. Ed. 2d 980 (1997)  
8 (discussing ripeness on a motion for summary judgment); *Nat’l Advertising Co. v. City of*  
9 *Raleigh*, 947 F.2d 1165, (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment,  
10 stating, in part: “Because the ordinance applied in clear, specific ways to National’s thirty-six  
11 signs when enacted, and because any injury to National was real and could be calculated in terms  
12 of reduced present value on October 23, 1983, National’s cause of action arose on that date.”).  
13 Here, GRE Downtowner alleges that the cumulative effects of the six ordinances effected an “as-  
14 applied” partial regulatory taking under *Penn Central*.

15           The question, then, is when did GRE Downtowner’s claim accrue? The answer is that it  
16 accrued, at the earliest, in 2022. At this stage, one must look to the allegations of the Complaint  
17 and “all reasonable inferences” drawn therefrom. *State v. Evergreen Freedom Found.*, 1 Wn.  
18 App. 2d 288, 295, 404 P.3d 618 (2017), *aff’d*, 192 Wn.2d 782, 432 P.3d 805 (2019). “A cause of  
19 action accrues on the occurrence of the last element essential to the action.” *Highline Sch. Dist.*  
20 *No. 401, King Cnty. v. Port of Seattle*, 87 Wn.2d 6, 14, 548 P.2d 1085 (1976). Thus, GRE  
21 Downtowner’s claim did not accrue until the impacts of the Ordinances on the Addison  
22 manifested to the point that there existed a taking under *Penn Central*. The following, non-  
23 comprehensive list of allegations in the Complaint support an accrual date of 2022 at the earliest.

- 24           • “The economic impact of the City’s ordinances on the Addison have been so  
25 severe that GRE Downtowner is unable to pay its mortgage and is in default as of  
26 ***November 2023.***”

- 1 • “As a result of the City’s ordinances, rent collections have plummeted from roughly 93% between 2015 and 2018 to below 45% *in 2023*.”
- 2
- 3 • “GRE Downtowner’s bad debt has become unmanageable as a result of the City’s ordinances. After hovering around \$42,000 between 2015 and 2018, bad debt . . . reached **\$515,846 in 2022**. Despite GRE Downtowner’s best efforts, bad debt remained at \$258,053 in 2023.”
- 4
- 5 • “Between 2015 and 2018, GRE Downtowner paid, on average, \$115,830 per year for security and maintenance . . . . But since and including 2019, these costs have almost quintupled, rising to an average of \$486,926 per year, including an astonishing **\$833,353 in 2022**.”
- 6
- 7
- 8 • The Addison experienced many millions of dollars in unavoidable operational losses in 2022, 2023 and 2024—another form of “economic impact” under *Penn Central*—that had, of course, not materialized in 2021.
- 9
- 10 • “The overall impact, based on various metrics discussed above, is also visually represented through the following graph:”
- 11



22  
23  
24 (Compl. ¶¶ 59, 68, 70, 80, 87, 94 (emphasis added).)

25 *Penn Central* claims rely, in part, on diminution in value of the relevant property  
26 attributable to the offending regulation. *See Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson*, 888

1 F.3d 445, 450 (9th Cir. 2018). In late 2021, the value of the Addison had begun to decline. In  
2 2022, the Addison’s value cratered as expenses and losses rose and occupancy plummeted. As  
3 shown above, rent collections fell and paying tenants moved out. (*See* Compl. ¶¶ 86–87.)

4 To hold that GRE Downtowner’s claim accrued in 2019—as the City wishes—would be  
5 to hold that GRE Downtowner’s claim accrued *before the Ordinances destroyed the value* of the  
6 Addison and therefore before the essential elements of *Penn Central* could have possibly been  
7 met. Under the allegations of the Complaint, the claim did not accrue until 2022 at the earliest.  
8 Even where it is unclear when a claim accrued, a court cannot dismiss on that basis. *See Deegan*  
9 *v. Windermere Real Est./Ctr.-Isle, Inc.*, 197 Wn. App. 875, 880, 893–94, 391 P.3d 582 (2017)  
10 (reversing trial court’s dismissal on the pleadings, and explaining that because the “complaint  
11 does not resolve when [plaintiff] knew or reasonably should have known the basis for his cause  
12 of action, the trial court erred when it concluded [plaintiff’s] claim is barred by the statute of  
13 limitations”).

14 The Complaint and all reasonable inferences establish that GRE Downtowner’s *Penn*  
15 *Central* claim accrued in 2022, at the earliest. Thus, even *if* a three-year statute of limitations is  
16 applied, the claims are timely.

#### 17 **D. The Cumulative Impact of the Ordinances Have Effected a Taking**

##### 18 **1. The Complaint Alleges a Regulatory Taking as Applied to the Addison**

19 The *Penn Central* factors are analyzed by engaging in the “essentially ad hoc, factual  
20 inquiries” necessary to determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred. *Tahoe-Sierra*, 535  
21 U.S. at 322 (citation omitted). Given the fact-intensive nature of the *Penn Central* analysis,  
22 courts are hesitant to decide regulatory takings claims at the motion to dismiss stage. As the  
23 Ninth Circuit has observed, the “admonition [against 12(b)(6) dismissal] is perhaps nowhere so  
24 apt as in cases involving claims of inverse condemnation where the Supreme Court itself has  
25 admitted its inability to develop any set formula for determining when compensation should be  
26 paid.” *McDougal v. County of Imperial*, 942 F.2d 668, 676 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation

1 marks and citation omitted). Likewise, Washington courts recognize this “admonition.” For  
2 instance, in *Maplebear*, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to  
3 dismiss a regulatory taking claim, stating that “the economic impact, extent of interference with  
4 investment-backed expectations, and character of the regulation are highly factual inquiries” that  
5 cannot be answered “[a]bsent more factual development.” *Wash. Food Indus. Ass’n &*  
6 *Maplebear, Inc. v. City of Seattle*, 1 Wn.3d 1, 34–35, 524 P.3d 181 (Wash. 2023).<sup>4</sup> Washington  
7 appellate courts even *overturn* CR 12(b)(6) dismissals of regulatory takings claims due to the  
8 lack of factual development possible at the motion to dismiss stage. *See Berst v. Snohomish*  
9 *County*, 114 Wn. App. 245, 257–58, 57 P.3d 273 (2002) (reversing CR 12(b)(6) dismissal of  
10 *Penn Central* claim, stating: “It is not clear, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no facts justifying  
11 recovery exist. The County argues that the Bersts alleged no economic impact or interference  
12 with investment-backed expectations. This is incorrect. The Bersts alleged in their amended  
13 complaint that the moratorium prevented them ‘from making reasonable use of their property by  
14 prohibiting any sort of development on it for a six-year period.’ They also stated in their  
15 complaint that the County denied their application for a permit to replace their single-wide  
16 mobile home with a triple-wide mobile home.”).

17 Here, the facts alleged state a claim for relief under each factor of *Penn Central*.

18 **a. The Value of the Addison Has Been Destroyed**

19 When evaluating the first *Penn Central* factor, courts consider numerous forms of  
20 “economic impact,” including the damage done to the value of the property in question and  
21 separate economic harms wrought on the plaintiff attributable to the offending regulatory  
22  
23

---

24 <sup>4</sup> See also *Becker v. City of Hillsboro*, 667 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1001 (E.D. Mo. 2023) (“Plaintiffs have pled that  
25 the combination of Defendant’s ordinances . . . has deprived them of all economically beneficial use of their  
26 property . . . . At this stage, these allegations are sufficient.”); *ABC Sand & Rock Co., Inc. v. County of Maricopa*,  
No. CV-21-01875-PHX-DGC, 2022 WL 1619019, at \*7 (D. Ariz. May 23, 2022) (explaining that the court will not  
“undertake a *Penn Central* analysis on a motion to dismiss”); *DoorDash, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco*,  
No. 21-cv-05502, 2022 WL 867254, at \*19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2022) (denying dismissal of takings claim where  
factual questions existed as to two out of three *Penn Central* factors).

1 activity. *See, e.g., Colony Cove*, 888 F.3d at 450 (“[W]e compare the value that has been taken  
2 from the property with the value that remains in the property.” (citation omitted)).

3 The City contends that the Complaint contains “vague” allegations regarding the  
4 economic impact of the Ordinances and lacks facts specific to the property value of the Addison  
5 after the Ordinances were enacted. The City could not be more wrong.<sup>5</sup> The Complaint contains  
6 over **35 paragraphs** of factual allegations that the Ordinances have destroyed the property value  
7 of the Addison, including this non-comprehensive list:

- 8 • “In addition to causing safety and severe quality-of-life issues for tenants,  
9 the economic effect of the City’s various ordinances on GRE Downtowner  
has been catastrophic.”
- 10 • “The Addison now hemorrhages money—more than \$2.7 **million** in just  
11 2023 alone. As a result . . . the Addison’s overall value has been  
destroyed.”
- 12 • “The City, through its functional commandeering of low-income housing  
13 properties in Seattle, has destroyed the value of GRE Downtowner’s  
property so significantly as to make the Addison unsaleable.”
- 14 • “GRE Downtowner has invested approximately \$39 million into the  
15 property, plus nearly \$5.8 million in additional losses between 2019 and  
16 2023. There is no chance of recouping these outlays through a sale of the  
property given the further diminution to value and operations caused by  
the City’s ordinances.”
- 17 • “The Addison must be operated as a low-income housing development for  
18 the next 23 years, due to its LIHTC structure. But the City’s ordinances  
19 have so severely hampered the Addison’s income that it is impossible to  
run the Addison at anything other than a significant operational loss—  
20 making the Addison functionally valueless on an income approach  
valuation basis.”
- 21 • “The long-term restrictions placed on properties by the LIHTC program  
22 also significantly limit the market for the Addison. The Washington State  
Department of Revenue has itself acknowledged that ‘due to the difficulty  
23 of transferring these properties because of the program requirements, the  
conventional “willing seller/willing buyer” concept is altered.’”

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24 <sup>5</sup> Notably, many of the cases the City cites in support of its argument were not decided at the motion to dismiss  
25 stage. *See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal.*, 508 U.S. 602,  
645 (1993) (motion to confirm an arbitration award); *Colony Cove*, 888 F.3d at 451 (motion for a judgment as a  
26 matter of law/directed verdict); *MHC Financing Ltd. Partnership v. City of San Rafael*, 714 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th  
Cir. 2013) (on appeal after a jury verdict).

- 1           • A property that required \$39 million of investment is now unsaleable,  
2           meaning that it has no value as an income producing property.

3 (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 22, 92–93).

4           Because the *Penn Central* test is an intensely factual inquiry, courts cannot make findings  
5 as to the specific diminution in property value at the pleadings stage, and therefore cannot grant  
6 motions to dismiss on this basis. *See, e.g., Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson*, No. 14-  
7 cv-3242, 2014 WL 12629951, at \*9–11 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014) (denying defendant’s motion  
8 to dismiss regulatory taking claim where the owner had “pled that the [Ordinance] had at least a  
9 small economic impact and interfered with its distinct investment-backed expectations,” even  
10 though the character of the government action did not weigh in favor of a *Penn Central*  
11 violation). Nonetheless, GRE Downtowner’s Complaint includes numerous allegations that the  
12 Addison suffered a near-100% diminution in property value (*see, e.g.,* Compl. ¶¶ 59–88),  
13 especially given that “discounted future cash flows produced by an income-producing property  
14 can provide an appropriate valuation methodology” for *Penn Central* purposes. *Colony Cove*,  
15 888 F.3d at 451.

16           The Complaint further alleges that the Ordinances have caused multiple economic losses  
17 in addition to destruction of property value:

- 18           • “The City’s ordinances have also systematically destroyed GRE  
19 Downtowner’s ability to keep the Addison occupied at sustainable levels.  
20 Combined, they have had two destructive effects on GRE Downtowner’s  
21 revenue from the Addison.”
- 22           • “First, they have caused the Addison’s long-term residents to move out,  
23 causing vacancy rates to skyrocket to a peak of **44.85%** in 2023.”
- 24           • “Second, GRE Downtowner cannot realize any rents owed from a large  
25 portion of its involuntary tenant base, meaning that even renting an  
26 apartment to a resident frequently results in little or no revenue from that  
resident.”
- “As a result of the City’s ordinances, rent collections have plummeted  
from roughly 93% between 2015 and 2018 to **below 45% in 2023.**”

- 1 • “Between 2015 and 2018, GRE Downtowner paid, on average, \$115,830  
2 per year for security and maintenance—that is, to keep the Addison’s  
3 residents safe and apartments habitable. But since and including 2019,  
4 these costs have almost *quintupled*, rising to an average of \$486,926 per  
5 year, including an astonishing \$833,353 in 2022.”
- 6 • “After hovering around \$41,000 per year between 2015 and 2017, primary  
7 property insurance on the Addison has increased between 19.5% and  
8 29.5% each year, culminating in a *\$151,377* premium for 2023.”
- 9 • “Further, the City’s ordinances have resulted in damages to GRE  
10 Downtowner’s financing as well. . . . GRE Downtowner has been unable  
11 to pay either the ‘developer fee’ or ‘deferred developer fee’ it owes. . . .  
12 GRE Downtowner’s inability to pay has resulted in GRE Downtowner  
13 owing not just \$4,735,209 in principal on the two fees, but also an  
14 additional *\$5 million* in interest.”

15 (Compl. ¶¶ 63, 68, 80, 84, 89, 92 (emphasis in original).) Notably, the Ordinances caused GRE  
16 Downtowner to lose nearly (a) \$6 million in operational costs, and (b) interest accrued on  
17 developer fees that GRE Downtowner cannot pay, totaling *\$13.5 million (and counting) in out-*  
18 *of-pocket losses*. (Compl. ¶¶ 88–89.) These are cash losses *on top of the diminution of value*.  
19 It is not one or the other that has devastated the Addison—it is both.

20 The City argues that “business impacts are not enough to state a *Penn Central* takings  
21 claim.” (Mot. at 21.) But mere business losses are not what this case is about. As described  
22 above, the Complaint alleges that the property value of the Addison was destroyed, not just  
23 damaged. These allegations, which demonstrate a severe economic impact under *Penn Central*,  
24 must be accepted as true at this stage of the case.

25 **b. GRE Downtowner’s Investment-Backed Expectations Have Been**  
26 **Destroyed**

GRE Downtowner has also pleaded the second *Penn Central* factor—that the City’s  
Ordinances have destroyed GRE Downtowner’s “investment-backed expectations.” Regarding  
this factor, courts “use[] an objective analysis to evaluate interference with the reasonable  
investment-backed expectations of the property owner.” *Honchariw v. County of Stanislaus*,

1 No. 21-cv-00801, 2022 WL 16748699, at \*6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2022) (citing *Bridge Aina Le‘a*,  
2 950 F.3d at 633). Thus, “[d]istinct investment-backed expectations’ implies reasonable  
3 probability, like expecting rent to be paid, not starry eyed hope of winning the jackpot if the law  
4 changes.” *Guggenheim v. City of Goleta*, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010). The status of the  
5 “regulatory environment at the time of the acquisition of the property” is also a relevant  
6 consideration in judging reasonable expectations. *Bridge Aina Le‘a*, 950 F.3d at 634 (citation  
7 omitted).

8 Here, the allegations of the Complaint strongly support the *Penn Central* claim, including  
9 this non-comprehensive list:

- 10 • “GRE Downtowner developed informed expectations on how to  
11 sustainably manage and operate the property over the long term. These  
12 expectations were based on GRE Downtowner’s own projections (which  
13 were themselves based on the performance of numerous past projects and  
14 the current state of the low-income housing market) . . . .”
- 15 • “No fewer than five other stakeholders reviewed and were comfortable  
16 with these financial projections at the time of financing. This includes  
17 Freddie Mac, the [Washington State Housing Finance] Commission,  
18 Citigroup (as bond underwriter), East West Bank (as provider of a letter of  
19 credit), and Stratford (as the tax credit investor).”
- 20 • “Also informing GRE Downtowner’s expectations and projections was the  
21 stability of the relevant landlord-tenant laws in Washington state and  
22 Seattle, which at that point had not changed in significant respects for  
23 many years.”
- 24 • “Between 2015 and 2018, when the Addison was redeveloped and fully  
25 operational and stable, the Stakeholders and GRE Downtowner’s 2012  
26 projections and expectations were met in all material respects.”
- “During the Addison’s redevelopment, two sets of detailed financial  
projections were made to track many financial metrics associated with the  
operation of the Addison through the Compliance Period. Both sets of  
projections considered LIHTC regulations and restrictions, as well as state  
and local housing regulations as they existed at the time.”
- “Between 2015 and 2018, the projections largely held as an accurate  
reflection of actual returns.”
- “GRE Downtowner’s financial data demonstrates that vacancy loss, bad  
debt, and other concessions were materially congruent in the 2015–2018  
timeframe, ranging from 5 to 7 percent. The same was true for total

1 economic rent, administrative expenses, maintenance and repair expenses,  
2 insurance premiums, and capital expenses. Overall, net cash flow  
remained positive and did not materially depart from the projections.”

- 3 • “Starting in 2019, when the effects of the Fair Chance Housing Ordinance  
4 became manifest, everything changed.”

5 (Compl. ¶¶ 31–34, 97–99.) Accordingly, GRE Downtowner’s investment-backed expectations  
6 for the Addison are alleged to be objectively reasonable. (*See, e.g., id.* ¶¶ 5, 34, 98.) Moreover,  
7 they were *correct*. (*Id.* ¶ 5.) It was only after the enactment of the Ordinances that GRE  
8 Downtowner’s projections were thwarted. GRE Downtowner was able to realize 72% of its  
9 expected profits between 2014 and 2018. (*Id.* ¶ 88.) Had GRE Downtowner continued at that  
10 pace, the Addison would have turned \$1,553,984 in profit between 2019 and 2023. (*Id.*)  
11 Instead, the Ordinances caused GRE Downtowner to *lose* \$5,816,245 over that period. (*Id.*)

12 The City, however, contends that GRE Downtowner should have reasonably expected  
13 changes in Seattle’s landlord-tenant laws. (Mot. at 22–23.) Of course it did. But the Mayor  
14 would not sign numerous of the Ordinances out of concern that they went too far. She was right.  
15 And that is exactly what courts following *Penn Central* have said constitutes a takings claim—  
16 when regulations go too far. They have gone so far in this case that the Addison’s value and  
17 GRE Downtowner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations have not only been harmed, but  
18 destroyed. The City may seek to argue to the contrary on the merits. That, of course, is a  
19 different matter that requires weighing the evidence. But it is no good suggesting that the  
20 Complaint fails to state a claim for relief.

21 c. **The Complaint Alleges That the Ordinances Permit a Physical**  
22 **Invasion**

23 Finally, GRE Downtowner has pleaded that the “character of the governmental action” is  
24 consistent with a physical invasion of the Addison. The character of a regulation is a “highly  
25 factual inquir[y].” *Maplebear*, 1 Wn.3d at 34. Under the third *Penn Central* factor, a “‘taking’  
26 may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a

1 physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program  
2 adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” *MHC Fin.*  
3 *Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael*, 714 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting *Penn Central*,  
4 438 U.S. at 124). Here, “[a]ccepting all of Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, as the Court  
5 must at this stage of the proceedings, the character of Defendant’s actions could [] be construed  
6 as [a] ‘physical invasion’ of [GRE Downtowner’s] property.” *Honchariw v. Cnty. of Stanislaus*,  
7 No. 21-cv-00801, 2023 WL 2938404, at \*8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2023) (internal quotations  
8 omitted).

9 With the Roommate Ordinance, the City required GRE Downtowner to submit the  
10 Addison to the physical occupation of individuals who GRE Downtowner *never invited* there in  
11 the first place—e.g., even including a tenant’s former dating partners. Such individuals can  
12 occupy the property without GRE Downtowner’s knowledge or consent and then: (a) cannot be  
13 removed for trespassing; (b) cannot be removed during the COVID-19 Eviction Moratorium; and  
14 (c) cannot be evicted for three months out of the year (the Winter Eviction Ban). (*See, e.g.*,  
15 Compl. ¶¶ 42, 49, 105–126.) This constitutes a physical invasion of the property, as alleged in  
16 the Complaint. (*See id.*) Below is an illustrative list of some allegations in the Complaint that  
17 support the third *Penn Central* factor:

- 18 • Before the City passed its ordinances, GRE Downtowner had the right to  
19 utilize trespass laws to expel unwanted individuals from the Addison.  
20 This was an indispensable method through which GRE Downtowner could  
21 ensure the safety of the Addison’s tenants.
- 22 • This is no longer the case. Through the Fair Chance Housing Ordinance  
23 and Roommate Ordinance, the City grants the right of occupancy to any  
24 tenant’s “immediate family” (which is so broadly defined as to include  
25 both ex-dating partners or anyone “presently residing” with the tenant) or  
26 “an additional resident who is not a member of the tenant’s immediate  
family.”
- There is no minimum time for a person to “reside” in an apartment before  
gaining occupancy rights to that apartment—as long as that person  
“presently resides” in an apartment, they are entitled to occupy it.

- 1 • These individuals now have a *legal right* to occupy the Addison . . . .
- 2 • The only way GRE Downtowner can remove these individuals is through
- 3 the eviction process, formerly reserved for actual tenants.
- 4 • “The City has granted a right of occupancy to individuals whom GRE
- 5 Downtowner never contracted with and whom GRE Downtowner wants to
- 6 expel from its property.”

7 (Compl. ¶¶ 123–26 (emphasis in original).) Overall, the facts alleged in the Complaint  
8 demonstrate that all the *Penn Central* factors weigh in GRE Downtowner’s favor and, therefore,  
9 the Complaint pleads a regulatory taking claim.

10 **2. The Complaint Alleges a Per Se Physical Taking Resulting from the**  
11 **Roommate Ordinance as Exacerbated by the Other Ordinances**

12 GRE Downtowner has also sufficiently pleaded a per se physical taking claim. The  
13 Roommate Ordinance—exacerbated by the Fair Chance Housing Ordinance and the two eviction  
14 moratoria—gives third parties “a right to invade” the Addison and, therefore, effects a per se  
15 physical taking on GRE Downtowner. *See Cedar Point*, 594 U.S. at 149. These third parties are  
16 individuals to whom GRE Downtowner has never rented nor ever agreed to rent, such as tenants’  
17 former dating partners and their family members. Thus, the City has imposed a landlord-tenant  
18 relationship with these individuals on GRE Downtowner. (*See, e.g.*, Compl. ¶¶ 39–40, 105–  
19 126.)

20 The Roommate Ordinance (again, exacerbated by the Fair Chance Housing Ordinance  
21 and the two eviction moratoria) is analogous to the regulation at issue in *Cedar Point*, which the  
22 Supreme Court ruled constituted a per se physical taking. In *Cedar Point*, the relevant regulation  
23 permitted labor organization members to access the plaintiffs’ property for up to three hours a  
24 day, 120 days a year. 594 U.S. at 143–45. The Supreme Court found that the regulation  
25 constituted a physical taking because it amounted to a physical appropriation of the owners’  
26 property that impaired the owners’ “right to exclude”—even if only for a limited time. *Id.* at

1 149. This is exactly what is, and has been, happening at the Addison. Just like the regulation in  
2 *Cedar Point*, the City has infringed upon GRE Downtowner’s right to exclude third parties from  
3 the Addison and forced GRE Downtowner to submit to the physical occupation of the Addison  
4 by, for instance, tenants’ former dating partners and family members.

5 The City contends that the landlord-tenant regulations challenged here cannot affect  
6 physical takings. (Mot. 14–15.) This argument crosses the line to deal with the merits of the  
7 claims, not the allegations of the Complaint. It is also flat wrong. *See Darby Dev. Co. v. United*  
8 *States*, 112 F.4th 1017, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“[W]e see nothing . . . that immunizes—as a  
9 categorical matter—government action implicating the landlord-tenant relationship from being  
10 treated as a physical taking.”); *see also Cedar Point*, 594 U.S. at 149 (“Government action that  
11 physically appropriates property is no less a physical taking because it arises from a  
12 regulation.”). The City bases this faulty argument on the Supreme Court’s decision in *Yee*. But  
13 the relevant laws in *Yee* merely regulated agreements between tenants and landlords that were  
14 entered into voluntarily. In *Yee v. City of Escondido*, the Court even acknowledged this  
15 distinction, noting that government did not “require[] any physical invasion of . . . property,”  
16 because the “tenants were invited by [the owners], not forced upon them by the government,”  
17 and that a “different case would be presented were the statute . . . to compel a landowner over  
18 objection to rent his property . . . .” 503 U.S. 519, 528, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 118 L. Ed. 2d 153  
19 (1992). Far from showing that the Ordinances cannot constitute a physical taking, *Yee* explains  
20 why they do.

21 Although the City cites to cases in which courts have found that the eviction moratoria,  
22 alone, do not constitute a physical taking, *see, e.g., Rental Housing Association (“RHA”) v. City*  
23 *of Seattle*, 22 Wn. App. 2d 426, 512 P.3d 545 (2022), GRE Downtowner is not challenging an  
24 eviction moratorium alone. That is simply not the claim alleged in this case. Again, the City is  
25 arguing the merits of the case rather than facing the allegations in the Complaint and the  
26 cumulative impact claim. And, like the *Yee* Court, the *RHA* court explained that “there is a

1 critical difference between tenants invited to live on a landlord’s property in exchange for rent  
2 and union organizers with whom the landowners had no contractual relationship and who never  
3 had permission to enter the land in the first place.” *RHA*, 22 Wn. App. 2d at 446. Here, the City  
4 has forced GRE Downtowner to allow individuals with whom it had no contractual relationship  
5 with in the first place, and who never had permission to live at the Addison in the first place, to  
6 reside at the Addison. This is the “different case” that, under *Yee* and *RHA*, constitutes a  
7 physical taking.

8 **V. CONCLUSION**

9 For the foregoing reasons, the City’s Motion to Dismiss should be denied.

10  
11 *I certify that this memorandum contains 8,151 words, in compliance with the Local Civil*  
12 *Rules.*

13 Dated this 3rd day of February, 2025.

14 STOEL RIVES LLP

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1 **DECLARATION OF SERVICE**

2 I, Malaika R. Thompson, declare that I am a Practice Assistant employed by the law firm  
3 Stoel Rives LLP, a resident of the state of Washington, over the age of eighteen years, not a party  
4 to the proceeding or interested therein, and competent to be a witness therein. My business address  
5 is that of Stoel Rives LLP, 600 University Street, Suite 3600, Seattle, Washington 98101.

6 On February 3, 2025, I caused a copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the  
7 following individual(s) in the manner indicated below:

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- facsimile transmission
- overnight delivery
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24 *Attorneys for Defendant City of Seattle*

25 DATED this 3rd day of February at Kent, Washington.

26 

Malaika R. Thompson, Practice Assistant  
Stoel Rives LLP

